By David Priebe, Chairman of Global Client Development
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The climate change debate is likely to continue unabated well into the future. Even if it is not settled anytime soon, the debate itself has already begun to affect the (re)insurance industry. Risk-bearers deal in probability routinely, making climate change another likelihood to consider. In this manner, it has entered natural peril models, risk management assumptions, and risk transfer strategies. Consequently, climate change has become part of the (re)insurance lexicon, despite the fact that scientific, sociological, economic, and political authorities have not reached a universally accepted conclusion. The absence of a definitive answer does not preclude the use of climate change-related information in risk portfolio management.

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By GC Securities, a division of MMC Securities Corp.*

The far-reaching effects of the ongoing global financial catastrophe have led investors and catastrophe bond sponsors to question the status quo. While the (re)insurance industry has persevered (particularly relative to the banking industry) it is evaluating the true extent of the risk that it has assumed. For sponsors of catastrophe bonds, this includes the reliability of the total return swap counterparty used to guarantee the collateral backing the risk transfer protection and the catastrophe bonds—as well as the quality of the collateral itself. While four catastrophe bond issuances have been affected by the bankruptcy of its swap provider, there are several areas on which sponsors and investors can focus to bolster the strength of their collateralization.

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David Piebe, Chairman of Global Client Development
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(Re)insurers have come to expect that alternative sources of capital will always be available. Private equity funds, hedge funds, and other alternative investment vehicles have contributed copious capacity to risk-bearers since the turn of the millennium, and especially following the 2005 storm season. The well, however, may be at risk of running dry.

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David Priebe, Chairman of Global Client Development
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Earlier this year, the (re)insurance industry celebrated an abundance of capital. Buybacks and dividends were common, as carriers struggled to find productive uses for their extra cash. Only a few months later, we are in the midst of a financial catastrophe that is wreaking havoc on balance sheets and constraining carrier access to capital. And, the situation could worsen. A major catastrophe event could place substantial demands on (re)insurer capital in a climate where replenishment would be both time-consuming and costly.

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Christopher Klein, Global Head of Business Intelligence
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The popularity of sidecars seems to have ended. The availability of traditional capital and access to insurance-linked securities (ILS) and other alternatives simply has made sidecars less attractive. But, reinsurers know that the market can harden at any time, with one mega-catastrophe creating near-immediate demand for fresh capital. Low overhead and an inherent exit strategy are likely to help these vehicles regain prominence in the next hard market—with investors and reinsurers alike.

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By David Priebe, Chairman, Global Client Development
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The capital models for (re)insurance risks are evolving. Over the past 15 years, alternative sources of capital have become increasingly important, particularly in the capital-constrained environments that follow major catastrophe events. As expected, capital market vehicles such as catastrophe bonds and sidecars have brought additional capacity to risk-bearers when they need it most, alleviating price pressure as a result.*

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Capital Markets Provide Necessary Depth

David Rains, Managing Director
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Life carriers struggle with the notion of hedging pandemic risk. The probability of an event occurring in any particular year is low. Even if an outbreak does occur, the process for estimating losses and determining reserves is unclear. Capital approaches do not consider probabilistic tail scenario risks. Quite simply, managing pandemic risk is an effort mired in doubt, though the potential for a devastating, multibillion dollar, worldwide outbreak is real. Traditional risk transfer tools have only limited utility in covering pandemic exposure. However, the depth and flexibility of capital markets may provide a robust alternative to traditional reinsurance.

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David Priebe, Chairman of Global Client Development
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High-velocity capital was crucial in 2005 and 2006. Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma struck with unexpected consequences, and (re)insurers were left with a USD34 billion price tag. Balance sheets were drained, and the hunger for fresh capital was universal. Some replenishment did come from the dedicated capital of traditional reinsurance companies, but for the first time, alternative sources were prominent and accounted for a third of the cash coming into the industry. Sidecars effectively made their large-scale debut at this time, funneling USD13 billion onto carrier balance sheets.

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Mark Hewett, Chairman of London Operations
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For several years, carriers have enjoyed a period of low insured losses, and access to cash has not been a problem. Traditional sources have been bolstered by the largesse of hedge funds, private equity funds, and even the wealth of high-net worth investors through a variety of insurance-linked securities (ILS). But, credit market turmoil has brought these conditions to an unceremonious close.

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Peter Zaffino, President & CEO
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All eyes will be on January, 1 2009. As we approach the next renewal season, another round of rate decreases seems likely. The pace should be slower than it was through 2008, thanks to greater underwriter discipline than in previous downturns. Thus, even though the market has not been catastrophe-free, it has been able to absorb the losses, as the industry is well-capitalized. Fears of a mega-catastrophe and pressure from broader economic conditions should keep underwriters from assuming inadequately priced risk.

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